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Law and Economic Growth in China: 
A Case Study of the Stock Market 
 
Zhong ZHANG * 
 
Abstract 
It is widely accepted that law is essential for economic growth. Prominent economists in China 
have repeatedly called for strengthening of the legal system so that the economy can continue 
to grow. Nevertheless, the fact that China has been able to achieve rapid economic growth 
while the law is weak seems to cast doubt on the significance of law. It is even suggested that 
China is a counterexample to the importance of law and more provocatively, it is argued that 
China's economy grew rapidly not “in spite of” but “because of” weak law. To gain a richer 
and deeper understanding of law in China’s economic growth, this paper conducts a case study 
of China’s stock market by examining its growth history and legal development. It is found 
that China has built from scratch a complex legal and regulatory system governing the stock 
market, which actually played a critical role in supporting the growth of the market. However, 
the trajectory of development was law following market growth, which was in turn caused by 
ideological and political liberalization. On the other hand, the market did not grow to its full 
potential and currently it faces serious challenges to fulfil the task of supporting the 
development of the economy, and the fundamental reason is political and ideological 
restrictions; likewise, the improvement of law for investor protection has not sustained, for 
which similarly politics and ideologies offer an explanation. The experience of the stock market 
suggests that, while law is indispensable for sustaining China’s economic growth, political and 
ideological liberalization is fundamental in that it is not only necessary to free up the economy 
so that it can continue to grow in the first place, but also crucial to further strengthening the 
whole legal system.  
Key words; Law, economic growth, stock market, China, case study.  
 
I. Introduction 
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China’s economy has slowed down considerably since the global financial crisis, and the GDP 
growth rate dropped from 14.2% in 2007 to 6.7% in 2016.1 As the economy decelerates, the 
debate about the sustainability of China’s economic growth intensifies. Most of the debate 
centres on macroeconomics as well as China’s demographic, environmental and natural 
resource capacity. 2  Alternatively, some prominent economists and legal scholars call for 
strengthening of the legal system, arguing that it is indispensable for sustaining China’s 
economic growth. 3  The Communist Party of China (CPC) itself has decided to 
“comprehensively advance governing the country according to law” and one important 
consideration is “to complete the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects.”4  
The classic view on law and economic development is that law is essential for economic 
growth.5 In particular, property right and contract law are key, because they provide a critical 
incentive for wealth creation and enhance certainty and predictability that are necessary for 
commercial transactions.6 However, the common perception about China’s experience is that 
China has been able to maintain a high growth rate despite the law being weak. It is said that 
law provides little explanatory power for China’s economic growth.7 It is even suggested that 
China is a counterexample to the significance of law,8 and more provocatively, it is argued that 
China's economy grew rapidly not “in spite of” but “because of” weak property rights.9 China’s 
own experience thus seems to suggest China could maintain rapid economic growth even if the 
legal system remains weak.  
To gain a richer and deeper understanding of law in China’s economic growth and answer 
whether China has to strengthen its legal system in order to sustain economic growth, this paper 
undertakes a case study of China’s stock market by examining its growth history and legal 
development. Just as the whole economy, the stock market in mainland China has grown to a 
substantial size since the opening of the Shanghai (SSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) 
in 1990, but the market remains peculiar, unruly and dysfunctional. Currently it faces a serious 
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challenge to fulfil the tasks that are expected of it to support the real economy. Moreover, the 
stock market not only plays an important role in supporting the growth of the economy, but is 
also a window of it. As the economy continues to grow, commercial transactions would expand 
both in scale and scope and become highly impersonal, just like investment and trading in a 
stock market. The stock market represents an advanced stage of development that the economy 
has to move to if China wishes to reach a high level of prosperity. Therefore, the stock market 
is a fitting case, an investigation of which would offer insight into the role of law in the growth 
of the whole economy and shed light on its prospect.       
The following section provides a brief introduction to the history of growth of China’s stock 
market. Section 3 presents the development of the legal and regulatory system. Section 4 
examines the role of law in different stages of the growth. Section 5 investigates why law does 
or does not strengthen, and explores fundamental causes for market growth. Last, a conclusion 
is drawn on the lessons that the stock market would tell about the whole economy.    
II. A Brief History of Market Growth 
The current stock market has its roots in the emergence of shareholding companies after the 
economic reform started in 1978. The first green shoots appeared in rural areas,10 but it was 
later in urban China that the shareholding system developed and stock markets emerged. From 
1984 the attention of economic reform shifted to cities, and the focus was to revitalize ailing 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Local governments were allowed to experiment with the 
shareholding system as a pilot scheme for SOE reform. In 1987 the CPC proposed to separate 
the ownership and management of SOEs and to expand the shareholding experiment. 11 
Subsequently, a flurry of share issuances swept over the country. Markets for stock trading 
emerged spontaneously, as holders traded shares at places like street corners—so-called “kerb 
trading.”12 From 1986 state-owned banks started to offer over-the-counter (OTC) service for 
stock trading and the OTC market opened in Shanghai in September 1986 by a local branch of 
the Industrial and Commercial Bank was commonly regarded as the first.13 But shares were 
unattractive and markets were lethargic, until a wave of “share fever” broke out in Shenzhen 
in 1990, igniting the enthusiasm of mainland Chinese for stock investment. 
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The Shanghai and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange started operation in December 1990.14 But 
the market was miniscule until early 1992 when Deng Xiaoping’s “Southern Tour” sparked an 
explosion of economic activities across the country. Share prices skyrocketed and a new round 
of share issuance was triggered. Stocks were so popular that on 9 August more than one million 
people queued in the streets of Shenzhen to subscribe for shares, which turned into a riot in the 
evening when many of them failed to acquire a subscription form.15 Share prices dived, but 
recovered after Beijing expressed continuing support for its development and the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen governments instructed financial institutions to buy shares on the exchanges.16 But 
the excess let loose by Deng’s campaign soon had its effect on the economy. Inflation rose 
rapidly and by 1994 reached a dangerous level of 24.1%.17 Forceful actions were taken to reign 
in the hyperinflation. Share prices then dropped from January 1993 until early 1996, and market 
growth slowed down. During this period the number of listed companies increased from 13 in 
1991 to 323 by the end of 1995, and funds raised via IPOs rose from RMB 0.1 billion in 1991 
to RMB18.5 billion in 1993, but decreased to RMB 4.2 billion in 1995.18  
By 1996 the macro economy had changed. The inflation rate had dropped and interest rates 
were cut. Moreover, the government’s attitude towards the stock market also changed. The 
previous SOE reform policies came to a dead end and the whole SOE sector recorded a net loss 
in the first quarter of 1996.19 SOEs were desperately in need of funding. Various policies were 
adopted to stimulate the stock market so that SOEs could raise money on it. Share prices then 
rose steadily from January 1996. By December, the Shanghai Composite Index (SHCOMP) 
had more than doubled and the Shenzhen Composite Index (SZCOMP) more than 
quadrupled.20 Increasingly, Beijing became concerned and measures were introduced to cool 
down the market, but it forged ahead. Eventually it was decided drastic actions were needed 
and the People’s Daily published an editorial, sounding harsh warning against “excessive 
speculation” and vowing to bring the market under control.21 Investors panicked and share 
prices plummeted. Shortly the Asian Financial Crisis swept the region and China’s economic 
growth decelerated considerably. The market became quiet with share prices moving in a 
narrow range until May 1999. Again IPO and listing had to be slowed down, but after this cycle 
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of up and down the number of listed companies increased to 851 by the end of 1998 and IPO 
funds reached RMB65.2 billion in 1997.22   
In 40 days from 19 May 1999 the SHCOMP jumped more than 65% and by 14 June 2001 
both the SHCOMP and SZCOMP had more than doubled. The number of listed companies 
increased to 1160 by the end of 2001 and IPO funds reached a historical high of RMB81.2 
billion in 2000.23 Underpinning this boom were again changes in the macro economy and 
supportive government policy. By 1999 the Asian Financial Crisis had subsided and the 
Chinese economy stabilised. Exports picked up, as did the inward FDI; inflation became 
deflation and interest rates were cut on multiple occasions. On the other hand, the SOE reform 
strategy fundamentally changed and the stock market was no longer only seen as a source of 
finance, but also a solution to the governance problems of SOEs. Large and medium SOEs 
were decreed to diversify their ownership and increase equity finance. 24 Corporatization and 
listing were established as the primary means of reform. Lastly, inspired by the “dot-com 
bubble” in the US, fraudsters in China fabricated various hi-tech stories and audaciously 
engaged in market manipulation.25 The market boom was also partly driven by fraud.  
After reaching a historical high on 14 June 2001, the stock market entered into a bear market 
lasting for 4 and half years, during which stock indices lost more than half and market 
capitalization to GDP ratio decreased from 48% to 18%. IPO was suspended 3 times and funds 
raised through IPO declined to RMB5.7 billion in 2005.26  The securities companies as a whole 
were in the red for 4 years. A series of shocking scandals were exposed, greatly shaking 
investors’ confidence. The market was gripped by bitter debates triggered by a prominent 
economist’s public denouncement of it as being “worse than a casino”.27 Another economist 
urged the government to “close down the market and start a new one from scratch”.28 The 
market slid to the brink of complete collapse. Again various measures were adopted to prop up 
the market, but to no avail this time. As the crisis intensified, the government realized that more 
needed to be done. A campaign was launched to crack down on market fraud and instil a degree 
of law and order. Investor protection was strengthened. Eventually the market recovered in 
2006 and experienced an enormous boom in 2007. By October 2007 the SHCOMP was nearly 
6 fold of the level at the beginning of 2006. The number of listed companies increased to 1550 
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by the end of 2007 and major SOEs, the “national champions”, including the giant state-owned 
commercial banks, were listed. Total market capitalisation rose to the second in the world and 
IPOs funds soared to RMB477 billion in 2007, by far the highest in the world.29 
However, the boom was short-lived and shares prices started to drop from October 2007 
and, as the global financial crisis intensified, embarked on a free fall. By October 2008, the 
SHCOMP had sunk almost 75%.  Again various actions were taken to prop up the market and, 
facing a looming economic crisis, the country’s leadership made a dramatic decision to spend 
RMB4 trillion to stimulate the economy.30 The floodgate for bank lending was also opened and 
new loans in 2009 almost doubled the previous year’s amount.31 The stock market responded 
fiercely and share prices shot up. IPOs resumed and a new board, the ChiNext, was opened in 
Shenzhen in 2009 to list growth companies. Funds raised in 2010 even surpassed the boom 
year of 2007.32 But the effect of stimulation was brief. The market lost steam after August 2009 
and went on a downward trend from 2010. In May 2012 the government instigated a “stimulus 
2.0,”33 but the impact was negligible. As share prices continuously fell, the market drifted into 
another crisis. IPO was suspended for more than one year until another cycle of boom and bust 
started in 2014.34   
In an aim to alleviate heavy debt burdens of corporate China as well as to facilitate 
entrepreneurship and indigenous innovation, the state machinery under the new leadership of 
Xi Jinping was mobilized from 2013 to stimulate the market in order for more companies to 
access it. CSRC relaxed regulation and prioritised growth over law enforcement; the media 
controlled by the CPC increasingly published bullish commentaries on the prospect of the 
market and senior government officials including the governor of the People’s Bank (PBOC) 
gave optimistic talks; 35  interest rates and bank reserve ratios were cut. Subsequently, the 
market staged a rally from July 2014 and by June 2015 the SHCOMP had risen more than 
250%. Investors flocked in and borrowed money especially margin financing exploded. The 
number of listed companies increased to 2797 by the end of May 2015.36 However, from early 
June 2015 share prices nosedived and the SHCOMP lost more than 40% in just over 3 months. 
The government panicked and desperate attempts were made to rescue the market. The so-
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called “national bull market” became a disaster. Instead of allowing more companies to access 
the market, IPOs had to suspend again and hundreds of companies queuing for an IPO had to 
wait for more time. The plan to introduce a US-style registration-based IPO system to allow 
more companies to access the market had to be shelved.  
The market rose from October 2015 in response to the desperate rescue actions taken by the 
government. As a result of these actions, a “national team” consisting of securities companies, 
investment funds and other state-owned financial institutions was formed, which actively 
traded shares on the stock exchanges under the direction of the CSRC to smooth out volatility.37 
The government gained even more control over the market and acquired an additional tool to 
make sure that stock indexes move in the range that it deems appropriate. However, the 
introduction of the so-called “circuit breakers” at the beginning of 2016, which was supposed 
to "protect investors and calm the market," triggered panic selling, and trading was halted for 
two days in the first four trading days of the year. The CSRC announced it would scrap the 
system on 7 January, by which time the SHCOM had already lost more than 10% in just 4 
days.38 In the following periods the market moved in a narrow range with reduced volatility. 
But the prices of small cap stocks continuously dropped, while the index for large cap stocks 
moved upward. At the end of 2017 the index for the ChiNex market was even lower than the 
bottom line reached during the 2015 crisis, whereas the SSE 50 Index, which comprises 50 
large blue-chip companies, climbed about one third during the same period.39 This divergence 
is due to larger bubbles previously formed in small cap stocks and the government’s actions to 
guide investment in blue-chip companies. As the market stabilized, IPO resumed and funds 
raised via IPOs amounted to RMB149.6 billion and RMB235 billion in 2016 and 2017 
respectively.40  
III. The Development of Law 
Although shareholding companies appeared from the very beginning of the economic reform 
and markets for stock trading emerged later, there were few corporate and securities laws 
before 1992. It was not until 1984 when the Shanghai government ratified a document drafted 
by the PBOC Shanghai branch that the first such type of legislation came about.41 At the 
national level, the first was a 1985 document issued by the State Administration for Industry 
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and Commerce permitting company registration.42 But throughout this period, the national 
legislature, the National People’s Congress (NPC) and its Standing Committee (NPCSC), as 
well as the State Council, did not enact any corporate or securities laws. The PBOC in Beijing, 
which was designated as the market regulator in 1986, promulgated only one major piece of 
relevant legislation during this period. 43 Since shareholding companies and stock markets 
sprang up locally and local governments were the experimenters and promoters, rules were 
adopted by some local governments to guide experiments. But these rules were rudimentary at 
best. For instance, the first legislation by the Shanghai government has only 8 articles 
altogether. Investor protection was not yet on the agenda and shareholders’ rights were barely 
mentioned in these local instruments. 
Following the “share fever” triggered by Deng’s “Southern Tour” in early 1992, a number 
of regulations were adopted by the central government. But it was after the riot in Shenzhen 
that legislation accelerated and a specialized regulatory body was set up. The top leadership in 
Beijing realized the risk that a chaotic market would cause and the importance of laws and 
regulations for an orderly market. 44 In October 1992 the State Council announced to establish 
a new regulatory system, consisting of the State Council Securities Committee (SCSC) and the 
CSRC. The SCSC would be a meeting system of senior government officials, responsible for 
policy formulation, coordination and organizing laws and regulations drafting, while the CSRC 
would be the executive office of the SCSC.45  
After the SCSC and CSRC were set up, legislation was passed at great pace. First, the 
Interim Regulations on the Administration of Share Issuance and Trading was adopted in April 
1993.46 This was a pillar of the legal system until the Securities Law was enacted in 1998. It 
was comprehensive, covering all the relevant issues concerning stock issuance and trading. To 
implement this legislation, detailed rules on information disclosure and anti-securities fraud 
were issued by the SCSC and CSRC in 1993.47 The SCSC and CSRC also promulgated a large 
number of regulations and rules to govern other issues, such as the organization and 
management of the stock exchanges, the regulation of securities companies and their businesses 
like underwriting, proprietary trading, investment consulting and fund management, the 
qualification and disqualification of securities practitioners, and so on. Last, abundant numbers 
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of normative documents, decrees, notices, etc. were issued, dealing with ad hoc issues, 
responding to changes or providing operational guidance. The total number of relevant laws, 
regulations and rules had exceeded 250 by 1998.48 
In December 1993 the Company Law was adopted by the NPCSC. Although it was criticized 
for its conservatism left over from the era of planned economy,49 a legal footing for company 
formation and operation was finally in place. While other laws and regulations were passed 
with high efficiency, the adoption of the Securities Law was long delayed due to bitter disputes 
on some key issues and a turf war between two departments of the NPCSC.50 The Law was 
eventually passed in December 1998 after the top leadership intervened in the wake of the 
Asian Financial Crisis, and took effect from July 1st 1999. Overall, the law was rigid and 
restrictive, reflecting the government’s approach of heavy regulation and control in the face of 
wild speculation and rampant fraud in the market. 51  Nevertheless, the enactment of the 
Securities Law marked the completion of the establishment of a basic legal framework 
governing the stock market. On criminal legislation, the first was a Decision passed by the 
NPCSC in 1995 to punish violations of the Company Law as well as fraudulent or unapproved 
public offerings and false disclosure of financial information by listed companies. 52  The 
contents of the Decision were included in the Criminal Law when it was codified in 1997. The 
1997 codification also added punishments for insider trading, divulging inside information, 
fabricating and spreading false information and manipulating share prices by way of trading.53  
Despite the establishment of the SCSC and CSRC in 1992, the regulatory system remained 
fragmented. The regulatory power was shared by other ministries such as the State Planning 
Commission, the PBOC and the Ministry of Finance. The Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges were under the control of the respective governments. Moreover, following the 
central government’s practice, provinces and cities set up their own regulators, over which the 
CSRC had no jurisdiction. The CSRC was weak, isolated in Beijing and lacked authority. It 
was a series of scandals that led to changes. The “327 government bond futures” scandal54 and 
Shanghai and Shenzhen governments’ using local securities companies and bank money to 
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manipulate share prices55 prompted Beijing to strip the two governments the control of the 
stock exchanges, which was achieve in August 1997. Further changes were made after the 
Asian Financial Crisis. In November 1997 the CPC decided to reform the regulatory system.56 
The SCSC was abolished and the CSRC was upgraded to the rank of a full ministry. The 
PBOC’s power of licensing and supervising securities institutions and investment funds was 
transferred to the CSRC. The quota system for share issues was abolished so that the State 
Planning Commission was no longer involved in the regulation of the stock market. Existing 
local regulators were taken over by the CSRC and new ones were set up across the country. By 
July 1999 a unified and centralized regulatory system had been established. The CSRC became 
a powerful market regulator with physical presence across the country. 
After the new system was established, the CSRC faced the serious challenge of widespread 
fraud. Corporate funds were routinely misappropriated, information falsification and false 
disclosure were normal practice, and market manipulators engaged in audacious scams. 2000 
and 2001 are remembered in the history of China’s stock market for the revelation of a series 
of outrageous scandals.57 The CSRC was forced to launch a campaign to crack down on fraud. 
As the stock indexes dropped further and the market was an existential crisis, the CSRC was 
pressured to strengthen law enforcement, which was helped by the regulatory overhaul with 
increased resources. In the meantime, laws and regulations were amended and new rules were 
adopted to provide more protection to investors. In August 2001 the CSRC decreed that at least 
one third of directors of a listed company should be independent.58 In January 2002 a corporate 
governance code for listed companies was adopted.59 As scandals continued and the crisis 
worsened, a large number of rules, documents and ad hoc notices were issued to address such 
issues as related-party transactions, use of funds by listed companies, takeover and asset 
restructuring, independence of listed companies from their controlling shareholder, and so on. 
In December 2004, the CSRC issued a regulation specifically for minority investor 
protection.60 In 2005 the Company Law and Securities Law were amended extensively to offer 
shareholders more legal rights and the CSRC more enforcement power. The Criminal Law was 
revised as well in 2006 to close loopholes and to increase corporate managers’ criminal liability. 
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Subsequently, rules previously adopted by the CSRC were updated in accordance with the 
revised primary statutes and more operational rules were issued by the CSRC.  
By 2006 investor protection had improved considerably. Major deficiencies in legislation 
were corrected and investors offered more legal rights. Regulations, rules and normative 
documents for investor protection were abundant. Enforcement was also strengthened, 
witnessed by both the input of resources and output of enforcement activities. In the following 
years, legislation further multiplied and the total number exceeded 1200 by 2013. 61  The 
enforcement system was further overhauled and the number of enforcement personnel at the 
CSRC increased. However, the output of enforcement activities stayed at the same level until 
the 2015 crisis and the improvement of law and order had not sustained. Fraud became 
widespread again during the 2014-15 bubble, and another enforcement campaign launched 
after the crisis led to a two-fold rise in the number of individuals and institutions penalized by 
the CSRC in 2015.62 
IV. The Role of Law in Market Growth  
China has built from scratch, a complex legal and regulatory system governing the stock market. 
It consists of a large number of primary and secondary legislation as well as numerous rules, 
decrees, orders, notices, normative documents, etc. The CSRC has established a sophisticated 
enforcement system divided into investigative and adjudicative functionaries, central and local, 
coordinative and front-line enforcement bureaus. The Ministry of Public Security has set up a 
specialized bureau with 6 local divisions for criminal investigation.63 In addition, the SSE and 
SZSE also have their surveillance, supervision and enforcement task force. Has this legal and 
regulatory system played a role in the growth of China’s stock market? In economic 
development law plays a protective as well as a non-protective role such as coordinating, 
signaling, credibility enhancing and providing rules for operations. 64  As far as the non-
protective role is concerned, there is no doubt that the legal system in China has the same 
functions as that of other countries. Indeed, it is suggested that the non-protective function of 
law is more prominent in centralized China, especially in the early stages of the economic 
development.65 What is controversial is the protective role of law in China’s economic growth. 
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Therefore, this section focuses on the function of law for investor protection and examines 
whether laws on investor protection has played a role in the growth of China’s stock market. 
China experienced bouts of “share fever,” one of which caused a riot in 1992, even before 
basic laws for investor protection were in place. Between 1992 and mid-2001 when the serious 
crisis started, the market grew steadily and the number of listed companies increased from 13 
in 1991 to 1160 by the end of 2001. On the other hand, although laws were adopted after 1992 
and the basic legal framework had been established by 1998, laws on investor protection were 
rudimentary. For example, the Company Law 1993 was seriously defective and legal rights 
and remedies that are critical for shareholder protection were glaringly absent.66 Even these 
rudimentary laws were not enforced. The CSRC did not have an enforcement department until 
1996 and, once established in 1996, the department had no more than 33 staff members until 
2001. There were few enforcement activities. For instance, the annual figure of market 
manipulation and insider trading cases sanctioned by the CSRC was in single digit between 
1993 and 2001.67 Penalties entered into by either the CSRC or the two stock exchanges in the 
forms of warning, public censure or fines against information misrepresentation were also in 
single figure every year before 2001.68 As a result, market fraud was widespread and blatant. 
Even the Shanghai and Shenzhen governments organized manipulation to boost stock trading 
and the two stock exchanges offered support. By the end of the 1990s and early 2000s market 
manipulation, false disclosure and misappropriation of listed companies’ funds by their 
controlling shareholders had become systemic. Misappropriation happened to 737 listed 
companies out of a total of 1287 at the end of 2003, and the total amount of misappropriated 
funds reached RMB113.2 billion, while the total profits of listed companies in that year were 
RMB178.2 billion.69 For false disclosure, one study estimated that 72% of listed companies 
engaged in such misconduct;70 for market manipulation, even the CSRC estimated 80% stocks 
were manipulated in 2001.71 Observers of the market summarized that “China’s stock market 
is a notoriously corrupt place. Securities firms, investment funds, finance companies and rich 
individuals all manipulate prices and spread prodigious amounts of false information”; 72 
“insider trading and manipulation of the market have been conducted almost half-openly”73 
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and were “something of an open secret”74. Basically the market was in a state of “law without 
order.” It was indeed “worse than a casino.” Clearly law was irrelevant and investor protection 
did not play a role in the growth of the market during this period.  
The market then fell into an existential crisis from mid-2001 until 2005. Why did this happen 
while China’s macro economy was at its best shape? Many so-called “opinion leaders” blamed 
the State Council’s decision in June 2001 to sell down state shares on the exchanges, which 
increased the supply of shares. 75  It is likely that the market fell in 2001 because the bubble 
became too big and a large number of companies made loss. 76 However, while statistically 
hard to prove, qualitative evidence strongly suggested that market fraud caused by weak 
investor protection were also responsible for the crisis. First, the revelation of fraud led to sharp 
falls of the share price and wiped out substantial amounts of market value of companies 
involved. For example, the price of Yi’an Keji, a listed company involved in a notorious market 
manipulation scam,77 plummeted from its highest point of RMB126.31 on 17 February 2000 
to less than RMB10 in January 2002. 78 The share price of Yinguangxia, infamous for forging 
export contracts and receipts to fabricate profits,79 plunged from more than RMB33 in August 
2001 to just over RMB2 at the end of January 2002 and reached the 10% daily price movement 
limit for 15 days continuously. In April 2004 Delong Group, a private conglomerate that 
acquired a web of financial institutions and bought control of 3 listed companies for 
manipulation, crumbled, wiping out RMB20 billions of market value in 10 trading days.80 
These cases showed that a scandal had a devastating effect on the share price and market value 
of a company. One study identified 212 scandals in the stock market between 1997 and 2005.81 
Hence the effect on the overall market performance was substantial. They were directly 
responsible for the fall of stock indices and loss of market capitalization during this period.  
A scandal not only affected the involved stock, but might shake the whole market. For 
example, after the fraud of Yinguangxia was publicized on sunday 5 August 2001, the 
Component Index of Shenzhen where the company was listed lost 4.38% on the following 
Monday, whereas the Index moved narrowly during the previous trading week.82 It was very 
possible that the sudden plunge of the market might be caused by the revelation of the scandal. 
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Since there were so many scandals, the market was rocked repeatedly and share prices were 
continually hit. It is possible that eventually investors found share investment was too risky 
and decided to leave the market. The Chinese stock market was not just “worse than a casino,” 
but also had a reputation as “a minefield full of traps”—one trip and an investor would be 
“blasted to pieces.”83 Faced with such a high and dangerous risk, investors understandably 
withdrew from the market. That is why in 2005 only 33% of all the trading accounts on the 
SZSE held stocks.84 The experience of the stock market during this period thus demonstrates 
that law is essential for sustaining market growth. Fraud caused by weak investor protection 
not only had devastating effects on market performance, but also erode investors’ confidence 
in investing the market, both of which inhibited market growth.  
The recovery of the market in 2006 led to an enormous boom. The market reached a new 
height and major state-owned “national champions” were listed. Again there are different 
explanations for the revival, but it is noticeable that by 2006 fraud that once plagued the market 
had been curbed and a degree of law and order established in the market. A campaign to force 
misappropriated funds of listed companies to be returned was well underway after the State 
Council’s intervention and the threat of criminal sanctions. In the meantime, laws on investor 
protection had been strengthened and enforcement considerably improved. Major statutes were 
revised and multiple new laws, regulations and rules were adopted to provide more protection 
for small investors. As a result, minority shareholders’ legal rights had been enhanced 
significantly and various indicators suggested that by 2006 shareholders’ rights in China were 
comparable to or even more generous than those of major developed economies.85 Not only 
were investor offered more legal rights, changes made in other areas also enhanced their 
protection. For example, to prevent securities companies from misappropriating their clients’ 
funds, the CSRC decreed in 2004 that investors’ funds be deposited in commercial banks rather 
than with securities companies themselves. The Securities Law 2005 formally stipulated this 
requirement. 86  Since then securities companies misappropriating their clients’ funds has 
disappeared. The same law provided that one investor could only open one trading account and 
the name of the trading account and the investor’s name should be identical.87 As a result, it 
has been much more difficult for manipulators to corner a stock by using multiple trading 
accounts and hide the fraud. The Securities Law 2005 also greatly increased the use of the 
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penalties of banning market entry, disqualification and suspending or revoking business 
licenses.88 These penalties would have a stronger deterrence effect than the administrative fine, 
which in most cases is a small amount of RMB300,000 for individuals and RMB600,000 for 
legal persons at most. The revision of the Criminal Law in 2006 made directors and other senior 
managers of listed companies or the controlling shareholders criminally liable for 
misappropriation even if they gained no personal benefit.89  
Not only were laws adopted to offer investors more legal rights, but law enforcement had 
also improved, which could be seen from both the input of resources and output of enforcement 
activities. As for resources, first, the CSRC’s enforcement department branched out of Beijing 
after taking over local regulators in 1999. In 2001, the enforcement unit of 9 major local 
regulators was upgraded to become a bureau directly under the CSRC’s control.90 In the same 
year a specialized enforcement bureau for investigating insider trading and market 
manipulation was set up at the CSRC’s headquarters in Beijing and the total number of 
enforcement staff at the headquarters increased by 32 to nearly 60. The total number of 
enforcement staff in the whole system increased to more than 270.91 A specialized bureau for 
investigating securities crimes with 6 local divisions was established in 2002 by the Ministry 
of Public Security. 92  In 2007, the CSRC’s enforcement system was overhauled again. 
Investigation and adjudication were separated and a new department was set up solely for 
adjudication. 170 employees, nearly 3 times the previous figure, were added to the 
investigation departments in Beijing and 110 at the local level. The total number of staff for 
investigation increased to about 600, nearly 20 times the figure in 1999.93 In addition, the 
CSRC was offered more investigative power by the Securities Law 2005, including the power 
to inspect and freeze bank accounts and securities trading accounts, to seize assets, property 
and evidence, and to restrict securities trading.94 Furthermore, CSRC’s capacity to detect fraud 
was also enhanced. For example, local regulators were required to undertake regular 
inspections of listed companies and securities institutions; both Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges set up a surveillance department and sophisticated computer software was installed 
to monitor abnormal trading and price movements in real time. This surveillance system is now 
a key instrument for detecting insider trading and market manipulation. 
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From the output perspective, various studies found that enforcement activities increased 
markedly from 2001. For example, data collected by Pistor & Xu (2005) indicated sanctions 
by the regulators and stock exchanges more than quadrupled in 2001 from the previous year’s 
figure; Luo et al (2005) in their study of law enforcement against listed companies for 
information misrepresentation found that the sanctions by the CSRC and stock exchanges more 
than doubled in 2000 and doubled again in 2001. While it was argued that the number of 
enforcement actions was still too low in light of the total number of listed companies, 95 there 
is no doubt that enforcement intensified considerably after 2000. Enforcement activities 
increased further after 2005 and the total number of sanctions by the CSRC and the two stock 
exchanges has since exceeded 100 every year. 
As a result of all these efforts to enhance investor protection, the scale and seriousness of 
market fraud had decreased significantly by 2006. The once-ubiquitous stock cornering and the 
audacious fraud of acquiring listed companies for manipulation had largely disappeared, as had 
the misappropriation of clients’ funds and stocks by securities companies. Second, although 
there were still news reports about controlling shareholders stealing listed companies’ funds, 
the days when this happened to 737 companies out of a total of 1287 had gone. Third, 
information misrepresentation was still a serious problem. Companies still invented profits and 
a large number still engaged in other types of misrepresentation, indicated by the large number 
of sanctions handed out by the CSRC and stock exchanges. However, compared to the days 
when 72% of listed companies were estimated to have engaged in false disclosure, there was 
no doubt that the situation had improved. All in all, the scale and seriousness of market fraud 
had decreased considerably by 2006, which could be a reason why the market revived. Without 
such improvement, it is reasonable to question whether the market could resurge in 2006 and 
survive the 2008 crash and the prolonged bear market between 2010 and 2014. 
To conclude, while the stock market grew steadily even though laws for investor protection 
were absent or not enforced before 2001, it fell into an existential crisis from mid-2001 and 
pervasive fraud caused by weak investor protection was no doubt an explanation. The market 
revived in 2006 after investor protection had greatly improved, which meant that market revival 
was based on improvement of investor protection. The experience of the stock market during 
this period thus demonstrates that law is necessary for market growth. It not only played non-
protective roles, but also offered investors protection to sustain market growth.  
V. Fundamental Causes for Market Growth 
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A. Causes for the Improvement of Law 
The experience of the stock market clearly demonstrated that, while law played a role in 
sustaining growth, the trajectory of development is growth first followed by law. The 
shareholding system and the stock market emerged and grew in the 1980s when a basic legal 
and regulatory framework was absent and investor protection was none. While the CSRC was 
set up and laws were quickly put in place after 1992, they were rudimentary for investor 
protection and basically unenforced until the severe crisis broke out in the early 2000s. The 
government’s decision in 1992 to establish a legal and regulatory system was prompted by the 
market bubble and the “riot” in Shenzhen, by which point waves of “share fever” had already 
occurred. The motivation was to bring order to the rapidly growing market. Similarly, the 
improvement of investor protection and establishing a degree of law and order was caused by 
the crisis in early 2000s, by which time the market had already grown to a substantial size with 
more than one thousand listed companies and tens of millions of investors. These investors 
became a powerful political constituency and their anger triggered by the exposure of series of 
grotesque fraud and the fall of share prices put enormous pressure on the government. 
Moreover, as the number of investors grew, the demand for financial and stock market 
information increased. In response, financial media and news reports proliferated, helping 
inform investors and enabling them to express views with stronger collective voices. The 
government was motivated by another consideration to tackle fraud and enhance investor 
protection. The stock market became a critical institution by the early 2000s after it had grown 
to a substantial scale. It was not only important for SOE finance and reform, but also seen as 
crucial for indigenous innovation, entrepreneurship and reducing risk in the financial system.96 
However, with the decline of the market, the implementation of all these strategies had to be 
put on hold. To revive the market, it was plain that fraud had to be curtailed and investors 
offered more protections.  
If the improvement of law is caused by market growth, it needs to be asked why the market 
grew in the first place. Fundamentally, political and ideological liberalization led to the growth. 
First, the shareholding system and stock markets were allowed to emerge in the 1980s, just 
because the ultra-leftist ideology that regarded capital as exploitative and evil was gradually 
abandoned and the politics barring private ownership of production means was relaxed. 
Speeches by Deng Xiaoping during his “Southern Tour” in 1992 further broke down the leftist 
dogmas that market was incompatible with socialism. The political stigma attached to the 
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shareholding system and the stock market was then removed, and the ideological and political 
obstacles for stock market development cleared. Second, political and ideological liberalization 
led to economic reform and growth, which underpinned the growth of the stock market. A 
demand for alternative sources of SOE financing was created, after funding from government 
budgets was cut off as a result of SOE reform in the late 1980s. As ideology and politics 
regarding SOEs were further liberalized after 1992, the stock market was not just a source of 
SOE financing, but also became a venue for reforming the governance of SOEs, adding more 
economic rationales for developing the market. On the other hand, as the economy grew rapidly, 
so did household disposable incomes and savings, providing sufficient supply to meet the 
demand for finance.97 In 1997 the CPC further liberalized its ideology and policy towards 
private ownership, 98  which spurred the phenomenal growth of the private sector and generated 
a new demand for finance. By the early 2000s meeting the financing demand of private 
enterprises became an urgent issue, hence the opening of the Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprise Board in 2004 and the ChiNext in 2009. By the end of 2011 more than half of the 
number of listed companies was private enterprises.99   
In conclusion, while law played a role in supporting the market growth, the 
establishment of the legal and regulatory system and the improvement of investor protection 
were caused by market growth, which was in turn caused by ideological and political 
liberalization. Ideological and political liberalization was fundamental, because it brought 
market growth in the first place and market growth in turn underscored the improvement of 
law.  
B. Barriers for Market Growth  
Although the stock market in China grew steadily and has become the second largest in 
the world in market capitalisation, it did not reach its full potential and meet the financing need 
of the economy. Before 2001 IPOs and listing were strictly rationed with an annual quota of 
the total number of companies that were allowed to list and shares to issue. Many companies 
including the most successful ones like Alibaba and Tencent had to opt to list on overseas 
markets. Since 2001 companies have to queue to be approved by the CSRC for an IPO. Even 
after having been approved, the timing of the IPO and listing is determined by the CSRC. 100 
The long-established practice is that the CSRC controls the IPO pace according to market 
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conditions. When the market is hot, approval is loosened and the pace quickens; when it is cold, 
approval is tightened and the pace is slowed down or IPO is completely suspended, which has 
happened many times. The number of companies queuing for an IPO amounts to hundreds all 
the time in recent years, meaning years’ wait. On the other hand, China has had an exceedingly 
high saving rate. More than one hundred and fifty trillion RMB is now deposited in banks and 
the size of China’s shadow banking had grown to $8.5 trillion by 2017.101 Ever since the early 
2000s the Chinese government has adopted a strategy of developing the stock market to support 
the real economy and reduce risk in the financial system, but this has not been achieved as it 
wishes, as testified by the 2015 crisis.  
      Why does the Chinese government have to tightly control IPOs? Why do companies have 
to queue years for an IPO while more than one hundred trillion RMB is deposited in banks? 
Fundamentally, this is because the stock market produces very low returns for investors.  
Research reveals that between 1992 and 2013 the return of the SHCOMP stocks was slightly 
above one, meaning that RMB one yuan invested in a value-weighted portfolio of SHCOMP 
stocks in 1992 would virtually yield a real return of zero by 2013; between 2000 and 2014 one 
RMB invested in a weighted portfolio of stocks listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen would 
decrease to 0.94 RMB in real terms. 102  The dismal return of China’s stock market is 
substantiated by the poor performance of dividend payouts. In the 1990s few companies paid 
cash dividends. Even by 1999, 59% companies did not pay any kind of dividends (cash or 
bonus shares).103 Overall, it is found the average annual dividend/price ratio of the mainland 
market was just over 0.75% between 1990 and 2010, the worst by a long way among the 12 
major markets of both emerging and developed economies.104 Because of the fall of share 
prices and the CSRC’s pressure on listed companies to pay more, the dividend yield increased 
to 1.04% in 2009, 1.14% in 2010 and 1.82% in 2011. It was announced by the CSRC in 2012 
that the average dividend yield of the 300 blue-chip companies reached 2.34% in 2011, 
exceeding that of S&P500 stocks.105 The CSRC thus proclaimed that China’s stock market had 
a value for long-term investment. But this claim is misleading. The risk-free interest rate was 
much higher in China. Even the government-set one-year deposit rate was above 3% in 2012, 
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while the yield of one-year treasury bills in the US was lower than 0.5%.106 The market-based 
interest rates in China were even higher than the official ones. For example, the so-called 
“wealth management products” were popular among Chinese investors and even the safest 
deposit-equivalent products originated by banks yielded around 5% annually. 107  It was 
misleading to compare dividend yields without considering the risk-free interest rates and the 
former is still considerably lower than the later in China. The low dividends are not due to 
companies retaining profits for business expansion. Most companies paid no or little dividend, 
simply because they made no or little profit.  
      The low return of the market is underscored by low profitability of the listed companies. 
Listed companies were described as “a capital-destroying machine” in the 1990s, and abundant 
capital raised from the market were wasted or simply disappeared.108 Profits created by these 
companies were lower than the opportunity cost of the equity capital they owned.109 The 
average ROE (return over equity) of listed companies published by the CSRC was 7.63% in 
2000,110 lower than that of non-listed companies and much lower than 19.1% of the largest 
1000 listed companies from developed countries and 14.62% of the largest 200 companies from 
emerging markets.111 The ROE decreased further to 5.35% and the ROA (return over asset) 
was only 3.02% in 2001, while the official interest rate for one-year bank loans was 5.85%.112 
The ROE increased from 2003, exceeding 10% in 2006 and reaching the all-time high of 14.7% 
in 2007.113 It then crashed in 2008, recovered in 2009, but dropped again from 2011, staying 
at 9.63% in 2016.114 Other research suggests that ROE of listed companies is actually much 
lower than the CSRC figure. One study found that the average ROE of Chinese companies was 
only 7.83% in 2010, while the figure of listed companies in the US was 10.71%.115 Another 
study revealed that the ROE was 11.14% in 2010, 9.85% in 2011 and 7.6% in 2012, and the 
median ROA was only 5.58% in 2012, again lower than the official interest rate for one-year 
bank loans.116 
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Ample evidence demonstrates the profitability of listed companies as a whole is low and the 
stock market produces little return for investors, which explains the market’s limited capacity 
to allow companies to raise funds and become listed, and why the government has to tightly 
control IPOs. For a long time, China’s stock market has been in a bubble and the government 
uses IPO control to limit supply of stocks to the market in order to maintain high share prices 
that are not matched by corporate profitability. Why is the profitability of listed companies low? 
First, the dominance over the market by inefficient SOEs surely reduced the profitability. 
China’s stock market has long been dominated by SOEs. Although the number of listed SOEs 
had decreased to 47% of the total by the end of 2011, they still accounted for 90% of the total 
assets, 86% of the total revenues and profits, and 74% of the total market capitalization.117 
Listing was supposed to improve SOEs’ governance, but serious problems remain. SOEs have 
been riddled with endemic corruption, excessive wastes and chronicle mismanagement.118 In 
such a state of governance, how can listed SOEs perform well in profitability?  Second, it is 
surprising that listed private companies were even less profitable. One study found that 
between 2002 and 2006 the ROE of private companies was lower than that of listed SOEs, in 
2005 being -1.4% as against 8.39% for SOEs.119 By 2011 the ROE for private companies was 
12.12%, still lower than SOEs’ figure of 14.51%.120 Why does this occur? As of the end of 
2006, 62.47% of the listed private companies were from the manufacturing sector with 
excessive competition and tight profit margins, while SOEs dominated the lucrative sectors 
such as finance, communications, public utilities, infrastructure and natural resource 
exploitation.121 It is clear that, due to entry barrier to the lucrative sectors, the profitability of 
private companies is low and the profitability performance of listed companies as a whole 
suffers. Third, low profitability is also caused by the difficult business environment with 
numerous bureaucracies and predatory financial burdens,122 as well as the fact that low-end 
industrial and service companies with tiny profit margins comprise the majority of listed 
companies in China.123  
It can be seen that SOEs’ dominance over the stock market and the lucrative business sectors 
leads to low profitability, which causes low market return, which in turn explains why the 
growth potential of China’s stock market was limited. Apparently there is an urgent need to 
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profoundly reform the listed SOEs, to allow more private firms to enter the market and to break 
down barriers that deny private firms entry into those lucrative sectors. But China’s state sector 
reform has long been stuck. Even worse, some previous reform measures aiming for de-
politicization and professional management have been reversed during the leadership of Xi 
Jinping.124 Why has there been no breakthrough in SOE reform? An answer can be found by 
taking a closer look at the Constitution of both the country and the CPC, which clearly state 
that “public economy” is the foundation of socialist China and “state-owned economy” should 
be the “dominant force.” Why should it be the case? Because, as Xi Jinping candidly pointed 
out, SOEs are the economic foundation for the CPC’s rule.125 It is thus plain that fundamentally 
politics and leftist ideologies impede economic reform. If the political system is unchanged, 
the potential of the stock market will remain limited.  
C. Barriers for law improvement  
Although investor protection has improved, the improvement has not been sustained and 
fraud plagued the market again during the boom and bust of 2014-15.126 After the crisis, the 
government felt the need to punish some culprits. The CSRC launched another enforcement 
campaign, resulting in a two-fold rise in the number of individuals and institutions penalized 
by the CSRC in 2015.127 Essentially, public enforcement of law in China takes the form of 
erratic campaigns and being selective—“killing a chicken to scare the monkeys.”128 It lacks 
consistency, persistence and real credibility. On the other hand, private enforcement by way of 
lawsuits brought by investors is negligible. The introduction of the shareholder derivative 
action into China in 2005 turns out to be “much ado about nothing” and basically no such action 
has ever been taken against malfeasant managers or controlling shareholders of listed 
companies.129 The deterrence effect of private securities litigation against misrepresentation, 
market manipulation and insider trading is minimal, because the Supreme People’s Court 
imposed various restrictions on such lawsuits and the class action was prohibited.130 Finally, 
the media are now muzzled and play no role in combating fraud, as do private institutions, like 
Muddy Waters Research, that profits from investigating and exposing fraud.131 
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     Why is public enforcement erratic and selective? In China whether a law is enforced or not 
depends much on whether the top leaders are serious about it. Instead of following the law and 
enforcing it consistently and persistently, enforcement agencies heed the attention and direction 
from above. This is because in China top leaders but not law has the supreme authority and 
power, and enforcement agencies are not independent. The fundamental reason for the 
ineffectiveness of public enforcement is political. For the private enforcement of law, first, the 
ultimate reason why the shareholder derivative action is useless is because the judiciary is not 
highly respected and trusted by the public.132 The judiciary is controlled by the CPC and the 
government, meaning that judges are not neutral and inferior in political and social status, 
which erodes public faith in their impartiality and authority. Second, the securities litigation 
against misrepresentation, market manipulation and insider trading is ineffective, because, in 
addition to the lack of authority and public faith in the judiciary, the American styled opt-out 
class action is unavailable and even the opt-in group litigation permitted by the Civil Procedure 
Law is restricted by courts, which is in turn because of the CPC’s strong suspicion of any 
organized activity not firmly under its control. 133 The class action is not introduced and the 
group litigation is restricted, because grieved investors might otherwise organize themselves, 
posing threats to the CPC’s control. The government is just not serious in empowering investors 
to call corporate managers to account by way of litigation, for fear of losing control. Last, the 
media have not played an important role in combating fraud, because the press in China is not 
free. Moreover, in a country where governments and business are closely connected and the 
police are a government department, investigative journalists have reasons to fear for their 
personal safety. Instead of being protected by the police from violent thugs hired by 
unscrupulous business, they may be arrested. For the same reasons as well as the fact that the 
CSRC stringently restricts short selling, the business model of profiting from fraud 
investigation and exposure is infeasible and private institutions like Muddy Waters Research 
would not emerge in China. All in all, politics explains fundamentally why the improvement 
of investor protection has not been sustained.     
VI. Conclusion 
China has built from scratch a complex legal and regulatory system governing the stock market, 
which actually played a critical role in supporting the growth of the market. It not only provided 
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rules for the operation of the market and played other non-protective roles, but also offered 
investors protection. Although laws for investors protection were absent or unenforced before 
the early 2000s while the market grew steadily, the market fell into an existential crisis from 
mid-2001 and widespread fraud caused by weak law was an explanation. The market revived 
in 2006 after the investor protection had greatly improved and fraud were curbed. The 
experience of the stock market during these periods thus demonstrates that law is necessary 
and did play a role in sustaining market growth. However, it is crystal clear that the trajectory 
of development is growth first followed by law and the strengthening of law was driven by 
market growth, which was in turn ultimately caused by ideological and political liberalization. 
On the other hand, the market did not grow to its full potential and the government has not 
been successful in developing the stock market to support the economy as it wishes. Currently 
the market faces serious challenges to fulfil the tasks that are expected of it. The fundamental 
reason is political and ideological constraints. Such constraints not only restrict market growth 
in the first place, but also limit the improvement of law for investor protection that is necessary 
to sustain market growth.  
The experience of the stock market indicates that law would be necessary to sustain China’s 
economic growth. First, though the economy has grown rapidly so far and law might not have 
played a critical role in the growth, growth may not sustain if law remains weak, just like what 
happened in the stock market. The stock market could be a window of the whole economy. 
Second, if China wishes to reach a high level of prosperity, the whole economy has to transfer 
to an advanced stage where economic transactions become highly impersonal like investment 
in the stock market, during which law must play a more critical role. Third, the stock market is 
crucial to the economic growth and law is essential to the further growth of the market. Hence 
law is important to the continuing growth of the whole economy. Nevertheless, the experience 
of the stock market also suggests that politics and ideologies are fundamental, which makes 
sense with regard to the whole economy. Currently the economy is inhibited by various 
restrictions. To allow the economy to continue to grow, China urgently needs to push forward 
economic reform and liberalize the economy. However, as the stock market demonstrates, all 
these depend on further political and ideological relaxation. That is why many economists and 
policy advisers voice their opinions that China has come to a point where economic reform 
would not go much further without political and ideological changes. Moreover, just like law 
for investor protection in the stock market, China’s whole legal system remains substandard 
and inadequate. To sustain China’s economic growth, the legal system has to be overhauled 
and law greatly strengthened. Nevertheless, without political and ideological changes, there is 
25 
 
considerable doubt as to how far law can further strengthen in China, despite the CPC’s 
heightened efforts to build “a socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics”. 
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